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Abstract 
Capital Jury Sentencing Recommendations: The Relationship Between Mental Illness-
Related Mitigating Factors and Life Versus Death Decisions 
Melinda F. Wolbransky 
Naomi E. Goldstein, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Over the past 10 years, the United States Supreme Court has created two categorical 
exceptions to the death penalty: the young and individuals with mental retardation.  
Researchers and scholars have suggested that defendants diagnosed with severe mental 
illnesses will be the next categorical exclusion, a decision that could affect up to 10% of 
death row inmates.  It is, therefore, critical to evaluate jury decision making in capital 
cases as it relates to mental illness – a factor that will be taken into consideration if the 
Court decides to hear this issue.  The present study examined archival court data from 
368 North Carolina capital cases.  We evaluated how mitigating circumstances related to 
male defendants’ (N=326) mental illness related to juries’ capital sentencing decisions.  
Results suggest that the relationship between mental illness-related mitigating factors and 
jury decision making may differ depending on the specific mitigating factor presented to 
the jury.  Both statutorily defined mental illness-related mitigating factors—(“capacity to 
appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct” and “mental or emotional disturbance”) – 
were significantly related to sentencing decisions.  However, neither the (1) presentation 
of, nor (2) jury agreement with non-statutory mental illness-related mitigating factors 
were significant predictors of sentencing decision.  The broad legal implications for 
defense attorneys, mental health experts, judges, and policy makers are discussed. 
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1. Background and Literature Summary  
Mental illness is an important consideration in many death penalty cases, with 
approximately 5 to 10% of death row inmates suffering from a severe mental illness1 
(Cunningham & Vigen, 2002; Mental Health America, 2006).  After the Supreme Court 
established two categorical exceptions to the death penalty – offenders who are mentally 
retarded (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002) and those who were under the age of 18 at the time of 
the offense (Roper v. Simmons, 2005) – many researchers and scholars believe that 
offenders diagnosed with a severe mental illness would be the next group to be 
categorically excluded from capital punishment.  If presented with this issue, the Court 
would determine whether the practice violates the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and 
unusual punishment clause by analyzing objective indices of community values, 
including jury sentences.  It is, therefore, important to consider the impact of a 
defendant’s mental illness on jury decision making in the capital context.   
1.1 Death Penalty Jurisprudence 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and 
unusual” methods of punishment (Granucci, 1969; U.S. Const. amend. VIII).  Courts 
analyzing an Eighth Amendment violation frequently employ the proportionality 
principle, deciding whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s 
criminal offense (Winick, 2009; e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 1977; Gregg v. Georgia, 1976).  
A punishment is “grossly disproportionate” if it does not comport with human dignity, as 
measured by “the evolving standards of decency” (Trop v. Dulles, 1956, p. 101).  In 
                                                 
 
1
 Consistent with the definition provided by NIMH (1987), the following diagnoses are included in this 
article’s definition of severe mental illness: Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, Bipolar Disorder, 
Major Depressive Disorder and other clusters of symptoms that have the potential to substantially affect an 
individual’s interpersonal and vocational functioning 
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Furman v. Georgia (1972) the Supreme Court held that the death penalty, as applied, was 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  The majority 
argued that death penalty statutes provided juries too much discretion, which resulted in 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty (Furman v. Georgia, 1972).  In response to 
Furman, states passed new death penalty legislation to counter the Court’s criticisms.  
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Supreme Court lifted the moratorium on 
capital punishment when it upheld the constitutionality of these new statutes.  As a result, 
all death penalty statutes now provide juries with more guidance, less discretion, and 
capital trials bifurcated into a guilt and sentencing phase (Bentele & Bowers, 2001).  
Recent trends indicate a decline in the imposition and effectuation of the death 
penalty in the United States (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).  Similarly, a comparable 
trend exists internationally, with 129 nations either de facto or de jure abolitionist 
(Babcock, 2007).  Nonetheless, the United States continues to impose the death penalty in 
37 jurisdictions.2   
Defendants receive individualized sentencing determinations that focus on each 
defendant’s character and the circumstances surrounding the offense.  In determining 
whether to recommend life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or death, juries are 
asked to weigh evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The prosecution 
must prove statutorily defined aggravating circumstances, which limit the application of 
the death penalty to those who are most deserving (Zant v. Stephens, 1983).  Conversely, 
the defense is not limited to statutorily defined mitigating circumstances and, instead, 
                                                 
 
2
 These jurisdictions include 35 states (AL, AZ, AK, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, 
MD, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NH, NC, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WA, & WY), federal 
prosecutions, and military prosecutions. 
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may present any and all mitigating evidence (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978).  Such evidence 
(e.g., age, mental capacity, history of childhood abuse) is used to show the jury why the 
defendant is less morally culpable and, therefore, less deserving of the death penalty.  
The presence of mental illness is one of the many possible mitigating circumstances.   
1.2 Eighth Amendment Violations for Classes of Offenders 
The Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis described above requires courts 
to limit both the type of offenses for which the death penalty can be imposed and the 
classes of individuals to which it can be applied (Winick, 2009).  In 1989, the Supreme 
Court was asked to determine whether the Eighth Amendment barred capital punishment 
for two groups of individuals – youth who were 16 and 17 years old at the time of the 
offense and mentally retarded offenders.  In Stanford v. Kentucky and Penry v. Lynaugh, 
respectively, the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on these offenders 
was constitutional.  During the past 10 years, the Supreme Court overturned both of these 
decisions (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002; Roper v. Simmons, 2005).  In doing so the Court 
critically analyzed the evolving standards of decency using objective indices of 
community values, including legislative and congressional judgments, jury sentences, 
historical developments of practice, public opinions, and international death penalty 
practices (e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 2002; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2008; Roper v. Simmons, 
2005).   
In Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the Court held that imposing the death penalty on 
offenders with mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.  The Court determined that societal attitudes had changed 
since its holding in Penry, and cited the large number of states that had already prohibited 
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such executions.  Further, the majority discussed this class of offenders’ reduced 
culpability, concluding that executing these offenders does not serve the death penalty’s 
purposes (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  Most recently, the Court held that juveniles who are 
under the age of 18 at the time of the offense cannot receive the death penalty (Roper v. 
Simmons, 2005).  After applying, “evolving standards of decency,” the Court outlined 
fundamental differences between juveniles and adults to hold that juveniles are less 
culpable and must be treated differently. 
1.3 Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System 
1.3.1 Prevalence of Mental Illness  
 The rates of mental illness in the criminal justice system are estimated to be at 
least double those in the general population (Cunningham & Vigen, 2002).  According to 
the U.S. Department of Justice (2006), more than half of this country’s inmate population 
has a mental health problem (i.e., 56% of state prisoners and 45% of federal prisoners).  
The prevalence of serious mental illness is also high, with estimates across studies 
ranging from 7 to 24% of all inmates (Lamb & Weinberger, 1998; Steadman, et al., 1999; 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2006).  
Although the exact number of death row inmates with a mental illness is 
unknown, research suggests that the rates are even higher than those in the general prison 
population (Cunningham & Vigen, 2002).  For the purpose of the current study, it is 
particularly important to consider the rates of severe mental illness in the death row 
population.  It has been estimated that 5 to 10% of offenders on death row have a serious 
mental illness (Cunningham & Vigen, 2002; Mental Health America, 2005).  Since 1983, 
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more than 60 people diagnosed with mental retardation or a mental illness have been 
executed (Barua, 2008).   
1.3.2 Mental Illness in Capital Sentencing 
 Although the presence of mental illness may be relevant in any type of criminal 
proceeding (e.g., insanity defense, competency to stand trial), most states explicitly 
consider mental illness at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor in determining 
whether to sentence a defendant to death (Izutsu, 2005).  Connecticut is currently the only 
state in which the death penalty cannot be imposed under any circumstances if the jury 
finds that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense3 (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 
53a-46a(h), 2009).  Elsewhere, capital sentencing statutes include mitigating 
circumstances implicating mental illness, such as “the defendant was under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” and “the defendant’s capacity to appreciate 
criminality of his or her conduct and conform that conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired (American Bar Association, 2002; Izutsu, 2005).  As required 
under Lockett, if the defense lawyer presents a defendant’s mental illness as mitigating 
evidence, the jury must not be barred from considering that factor in its sentencing 
determination. 
Even if a defendant is sentenced to death, states are prohibited from executing 
offenders who are do not “know the fact of their impending execution and the reason for 
it” (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, p. 422; Panetti v. Quarterman, 2007).  The Ford Court 
found that carrying out the death penalty on this group of offenders had no deterrent or 
                                                 
 
3
 A Connecticut jury cannot sentence a defendant to death if they find “the defendant’s mental capacity was 
significantly impaired or the defendant’s ability to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirements of 
the law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to 
prosecution.”  
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retributive value, concluding that “the execution of an insane person simply offends 
humanity” (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, p. 407).  Despite this ban on executing a legally 
insane offender, the Supreme Court has not yet held that imposing the death penalty on 
offenders with severe mental illness violates the Constitution.  As a result, these 
offenders must present mitigating evidence related to their mental illnesses during their 
trials’ sentencing phase in hopes of receiving a life sentence.  
1.4 Prior Research on Mental Illness as a Mitigating Factor 
Social scientists and legal scholars have published a great deal of relevant 
scholarship and research, but only a fraction of the empirical research conducted has 
focused on the efficacy of mitigating evidence.  Researchers assessing mitigating 
circumstances have employed a number of methodologies, including surveying capital 
juries (e.g., Garvey, 1998; Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988; Polzer & Kempf-Leonard, 
2009), creating jury simulations (e.g., Barnett, Brodsky & Davis, 2004; Barnett, Brodsky 
& Price, 2007; Tetterton & Brodsky, 2007; White, 1987), and analyzing archival data 
(e.g., Beck & Schumsky, 1997; Lenza, Keys & Guess, 2005).  Despite the high 
prevalence of mental illness in capital defendants, only a few studies have evaluated 
mental illness as a mitigating factor.   
 How jurors evaluate and utilize mitigating evidence in their sentencing 
determinations, particularly factors implicating mental illness, remains unclear.  Studies 
of both mock jurors and post-verdict surveys of capital juries have revealed that jurors are 
more likely to recommend life over death when mitigating evidence, including evidence 
of severe mental illness, is presented to the jury (Barnett, et al., 2004; Barnett, et al., 
2007; Garvey, 1998).  One study found that the majority of capital jurors may consider 
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extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of the offense and a history of mental 
illness as mitigating factors (Garvey, 1998).  Research also suggests that a history of 
hospitalization for mental illness is a strong mitigating factor, as is a defendant 
“diagnosed with schizophrenia, not medicated, [who] suffered from severe delusions and 
hallucinations” (Barnett, et al., 2004, p. 762; Barnett, et al., 2007).   
Conversely, academics, researchers, and case law suggest that juries may view 
severe mental illness as an aggravating factor (e.g., Berhman, 1989; Miller v. State, 
19794; Ryan & Berson, 2006).  For example, approximately one-quarter of mock jurors 
incorrectly indicated that the following statutorily defined mitigating circumstances were 
aggravating factors: “impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of defendant’s conduct” 
and an “offense committed under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance” 
(Haney & Lynch, 1994, p. 433).  Furthermore, this bias towards viewing mental illness as 
an aggravating factor may be compounded by the fact that only those jurors who would 
be able to cast a vote for a death sentence are permitted to sit on a capital jury.  It has 
been shown that these death-qualified jurors may be less likely to find mental illness-
related mitigating circumstances than their excluded counterparts (e.g., Butler & Moran, 
2007).  Some studies suggest that when evidence of severe mental illness is presented to 
juries, they are actually more likely to find a defendant guilty (Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, 
& Thompson, 1984) and recommend a death sentence (White, 1987). 
Even if a capital jury does not improperly consider mental illness evidence as an 
aggravator, they may still mistakenly disregard it as proper mitigating evidence (Eddings 
                                                 
 
4
 The Florida Supreme Court vacated a death sentence after it found that the jury had incorrectly considered 
the defendant’s diagnosis of schizophrenia as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor (Miller v. State, 
1979).   
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v. Oklahoma, 1982; e.g., Beck & Shumsky, 1997; Bentele & Bowers, 2001; Polzer & 
Kempf-Leonard, 2009).  There are a few suggested reasons for this misuse of the 
evidence.  First, it has been shown that juries commonly misunderstand capital 
sentencing instructions and have difficulty defining “mitigation” (e.g., Bentele & Bowers, 
2001; Haney & Lynch, 1994).  Second, despite contrary Supreme Court precedent 
(McKoy v. North Carolina, 1990; Mills v. Maryland, 1988), jurors may also mistakenly 
believe that to find a circumstance to be mitigating, they must reach that decision 
unanimously or that the threshold for the decision must reach the beyond a reasonable 
doubt burden of proof used during the guilt-phase (Bentele & Bowers, 2001).  Third, 
research suggests that jurors erroneously believe the defendant’s mental illness must rise 
to the level of insanity to be mitigating (Bentele & Bowers, 2001; White, 1987).  Within 
this small body of research, it remains unclear exactly how jurors evaluate and utilize 
mitigating evidence in their capital sentencing determinations. 
2. Current Study  
The prevalence of mental illness among death row inmates, together with the 
categorical exceptions carved out in Atkins, Roper, and Ford, lead many to conclude that 
defendants with severe mental illness at the time of the offense will be the next group of 
offenders excluded from capital punishment eligibility (e.g., ABA, 2006; Batey, 2009; 
Slobogin, 2003).  If the Supreme Court decides to hear this issue, it seems likely that the 
Court will follow its analysis in Atkins and Roper by assessing the evolving standards of 
decency, as measured by objective indices of community values, to determine whether 
such executions violate the Eighth Amendment.  Evidence related to the presence of 
mental illness should serve as mitigating evidence when reaching a death 
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recommendation; however, previous research (e.g., Bentele & Bowers, 2001; Haney & 
Lynch, 1994; Polzer & Kempf-Leonard, 2009; White, 1987) suggests that juries may not 
follow these instructions.   
Previous research examining the efficacy of mitigating circumstances related to 
mental illness has not provided the ecological validity of actual capital sentencing 
hearings.  Furthermore, the results are mixed about how jurors view mental illness 
mitigation and, more importantly, about the impact of such views on sentencing 
recommendations.  Jury simulations allow the researcher to control for confounding 
variables but fail to reflect the “death is different” reality of capital trials.  Although 
conducting interviews with capital jurors can offer more generalizable conclusions, 
jurors’ retrospective self-reports are prone to bias (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992).  Thus, 
the current study sought to add to this critical body of research by examining how actual 
juries view evidence of mental illness and how their agreement with mental illness-
related mitigation factors relates to sentencing recommendations.  Using archival court 
data from capital cases to study the impact of mental-illness related mitigation 
information on juries’ decisions will provide a higher level of ecological validity.    
The current study evaluated how mitigating circumstances related to male 
defendant’s mental illness were associated with actual juries’ decision-making during 
capital sentencing.5  The purpose was two-fold: (1) to fill the gap in previous mitigation 
research by evaluating real-world jury decision-making through the use of archival data; 
and (2) to examine one of the objective indices of community values under the Eighth 
                                                 
 
5
 During the time period in which these cases were on trial, there were 13 cases of women defendants.  
However, given the rarity of female capital defendants and potential gender-specific issues, these cases 
were not included in this study (Streib, 2005). 
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Amendment proportionality analysis by studying actual jury sentences during capital 
trials.   
This type of data is a useful and timely addition to the growing body of 
commentary calling for the exclusion of offenders with severe mental illness from 
receiving the death penalty (e.g., Batey, 2009).  Proponents have rooted their arguments 
in the Atkins, Roper, and Ford decisions.  Many explain that offenders with severe mental 
illness are no more culpable than those with mental retardation or those who were under 
the age of 18 at the time of the offense (e.g., Hornberg, 2005; Izutsu, 2005; Slobogin, 
2003).  Similarly, a defendant who exhibits symptoms of severe mental illness can 
adversely impact capital proceedings in ways that are similar to defendants with obvious 
symptoms of mental retardation (Hornberg, 2005; Izutsu, 2005).  Over the past 5 years, a 
number of professional groups have adopted this position, including the American Bar 
Associations’s House of Delegates, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI), 
the American Psychological Association, and the American Psychiatric Association (e.g., 
ABA, 2006).  State court justices and federal judges have also voiced their concerns 
about imposing the death penalty on offenders with severe mental illness (Izutsu, 2005; 
Shin, 2007).  This practice also is at odds with international legal standards (Shin, 2007).   
The push for a mental illness categorical exclusion is mostly limited to offenders 
with severe mental illness6 (e.g., ABA, 2006; Ryan & Berson, 2006; Wilkins, 2009).  
However, the present research was not limited to severe mental illness because the 
                                                 
 
6
 The ABA’s Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty’s definition of severe mental illness 
included the following diagnoses: schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, bipolar disorder, major  
 
 
depressive disorder, and dissociative disorders (ABA, 2006).  However, NAMI and the international 
community appear to prefer a complete bar against executing offenders with any mental illness. 
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availability of case-specific severity information was incomplete.  Instead, the goal of the 
primary research question (and analyses) was to accurately study the presentation of 
mental illness-related mitigating evidence to juries.  Broadening the scope beyond severe 
mental illness also allowed this study to cover its dual aims described above by 
accurately examining real-world capital jury decision making, one of the objective indicia 
of community values used to determine whether imposing this punishment is cruel and 
unusual.  The current study, therefore, provides novel, timely, and relevant information to 
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers about the efficacy of mental illness-related 
mitigation.   
2.1 Primary Hypothesis 
Based on previous research, the hypotheses originally proposed to examine 
sentencing decisions from two independent variables, each examined separately: (1) the 
presentation of mental illness-related mitigating factors to the jury, and (2) jury 
agreement with the mitigating value of those factors when presented to the jury.  
However, after preliminary analyses were conducted, it was determined that presentation 
of mental illness-related mitigating factors and jury agreement with such factors could 
not be separated.  This was due to the fact that information about jury agreement was 
unavailable in those cases in which mental illness-related mitigating factors were not 
presented to the jury.        
Thus, the primary revised research question integrated these two predictor 
variables and examined whether sentencing recommendation (i.e., probability of death) 
was related to (1) whether the jury agreed with a mental illness-related mitigating factor 
when it was presented, (2) whether the jury disagreed with a mental illness-related 
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mitigating factor when it was presented, or (3) when no mental-illness related mitigating 
factor was presented to the jury.  Given this more accurate representation of the current 
study’s goals, the original secondary hypothesis became the primary hypothesis: Jury 
agreement with a presented mental illness-related mitigating factor (i.e., that it was in fact 
mitigating) would predict a greater probability that the jury recommended a life sentence 
(instead of death), compared to when the jury disagreed that the presented factor was 
mitigating or when the factor was not presented to the jury at all.  A mediating 
relationship could not be evaluated because the intended mediator (agreement) was only 
available when a mental illness-related mitigating factor was presented (agreement was 
not questioned when the factor was not presented to the jury).   
2.2 Exploratory Analyses 
The relationship between sentencing recommendations and two additional 
predictor variables was explored: (1) serious mental illness (i.e., whether the jury agreed 
with serious mental illness as a mitigating factor when it was presented, whether the jury 
disagreed with serious mental illness as a mitigating factor when it was presented, and 
when serious mental illness was not presented as a mitigating factor to the jury), and (2) 
the specific combination of mental illness-related mitigating factors the jury agreed upon 
as mitigating when they were presented to the jury.  
Lastly, the following exploratory hypothesis was proposed: the relationship 
between jury sentencing recommendations and the presentation of mental illness-related 
mitigating factors would depend on trial year.  Specifically, the relationship was 
examined between capital trials before and after 1989, the year the ABA Guidelines for 
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the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases was published, and 
before and after 1994, the year in which LWOP was made available in North Carolina.  
3. Method 
3.1 Data Collection 
3.1.1 Participants 
The current study examined a large, archival database that included all (N = 368) 
of the publicly available capital cases in North Carolina between 1982 and 1998.  The 
database included both demographic and case-specific variables for each case.  Of the 
original 368 capital defendants within the dataset, a total of 326 were included in the 
analyses.  Thirteen cases with female defendants were excluded because of the potential 
uniqueness of these female defendants, and 29 cases were excluded in which the original 
sentence was overturned and the defendant subsequently received a new sentencing 
hearing.7  Approximately half (48.9%) of the capital defendants were identified as 
African American, 45.5% as white, 3.1% as American Indian, 0.9% as Hispanic or 
Latino, 0.3% as Asian, and 0.9%  as other.  At the time of trial, capital defendants ranged 
in age from 17 to 65 (M = 31.16, SD = 9.29).   
3.1.2 North Carolina’s Death Penalty 
This dataset of North Carolina capital cases is important for a number of reasons.  
First, the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme is similar to that in the majority of 
other states.8  Its capital sentencing statute enumerates a list of 11 possible statutory 
aggravating factors and a non-exclusive list of 9 statutory mitigating factors (N.C.G.S.A 
                                                 
 
7
 This is based on the data available at the time of these analyses.  It is possible that other sentences used in 
this study have since been overturned on appeal; however, that information was not available.   
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 § 15A-2000(f), 2010).  In addition, the defense attorney may ask the jury to consider any 
other non-statutory mitigating factor.  The jury is instructed to weigh the presented 
aggravating circumstances against the presented mitigating circumstances before 
deciding whether to recommend life9 or death.  After the jury has deliberated, they are 
asked to indicate (on documents provided to them) whether or not jurors agreed with the 
circumstances presented.  The comparability of this scheme to other states makes this 
dataset generalizable beyond North Carolina.   
Second, North Carolina currently has the seventh largest death row inmate 
population with 157 inmates (Death Penalty Info, 2009).  It has been estimated that more 
than 10% of these men and women are diagnosed with a severe mental illness (Common 
Sense Foundation, 2008).  On February 12, 2009, North Carolina General Assembly 
introduced a bill that would ban the execution of persons with severe mental illness at the 
time of the offense (H.B. 137, 2009).  It did not become law, but it does suggest that 
North Carolina legislators are aware of the issues surrounding the execution of mentally 
ill offenders.  It is, therefore, important to study mental illness mitigation and jury 
decision making to aid law makers who intend to introduce similar legislation.      
 
3.2 Data Selection 
  North Carolina juries may be asked to consider a total of 20 possible statutory 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and an unlimited number of non-statutory 
                                                                                                                                                 
8
 North Carolina is considered a “weighing” state.  Of the 34 other jurisdictions that impose the death 
penalty, 22 (including the federal and military prosecutions) specifically require the jury to weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances (e.g., AL, CA, PA).  The remaining jurisdictions either require 
the jury to “consider all” of the evidence (e.g., LA, MO, WY), find the mitigating circumstances are not 
“sufficiently mitigating,” (e.g., AZ, MT, OR) or only require a finding that an aggravated circumstance(s) 
exists before imposing the death penalty (e.g., SC, VA).  
9
 While North Carolina currently has LWOP, it did not have this option until 1994.  Juries, therefore, did 
not have this option during the first 12 years the database cases went to trial. 
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mitigating circumstances.  The present study was concerned with three mitigating factors 
(two statutory and one non-statutory) that implicate mental illness: (1) “The capital 
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or 
emotional disturbance” (i.e., “mental or emotional disturbance”; N.C.G.S.A § 15A-
2000(f)(2)), (2) “The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired” (i.e., 
“appreciate or conform conduct”; N.C.G.S.A § 15A-2000(f)(6)), and (3) evidence of 
mental illness presented as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance.  See Appendix A for 
complete list of North Carolina’s enumerated mitigating factors.  Specifically, this study 
sought to compare the cases in which juries were presented with mental illness-related 
mitigation with those cases in which no mental illness mitigation was presented.  Of 
those cases in which mental illness-related mitigating factors were presented, the 
relationship between jury agreement with each of the factors presented and ultimate 
sentencing recommendation was also studied.  Additionally, the available data on the 
type of mental illness-related mitigating factors presented to the jury were coded as either 
severe mental illness or non-severe mental illness (i.e., all other mental illness 
information).  Descriptive results are presented below.   
 
A number of control variables also were selected from the available data.10  The 
extant literature on jury decision making was reviewed to determine which aggravating 
                                                 
 
10
 In determining the best method of data selection, matching cases on important variables was considered.  
However, this method was ultimately rejected as it would reduce the data pool beyond the requisite 
number.  In addition, the cases that would have been included using this method (i.e., only those cases that 
matched with another case in the database on important variables) may not have been an accurate 
representation of the database as a whole and, therefore, may have skewed the data. 
Mental Illness Mitigation in Capital Sentencing   16 
 
 
 
 
and mitigating factors had been found to significantly predict jury sentencing 
recommendations.  It appeared that two aggravating factors were consistently found to 
relate to jury sentencing recommendations: the heinousness of the crime (Butler & 
Moran, 2007; Garvey, 1998; Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988; Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 
1988; Polzer & Kempf-Leonard, 2009) and the defendant’s criminal history (Garvey, 
1998; Lenza, Keys, & Guess, 2005). Both of these factors are included in North 
Carolina’s sentencing statute and were included in the primary analyses as control 
variables (see Appendix A).  Further, all of the statutorily defined mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances were included in additional analyses to explore the 
relationship between the mental illness-related mitigating factors and jury sentencing 
recommendations while accounting for all other statutory factors.  
 Variables were also selected to address post-database changes in death penalty 
case law.  As previously mentioned, it is now unconstitutional to sentence a defendant 
with mental retardation to death (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002).  Those cases where evidence 
of mental retardation was presented to the jury were explored to assess the relationship 
between the presentation of mental retardation and mental illness-related mitigating 
factors, and their relationship with jury sentencing recommendations.   
 
 
3.3 Method of Analysis 
Initial analyses were run using Chi-square tests to determine the relationship 
between presentation/jury agreement regarding mitigating evidence (presented and jury 
agreed; presented and jury disagreed; not presented) and each of the three mental illness-
related mitigating factors.  To test the primary hypothesis, logistic regression was used to 
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examine whether presentation/ jury agreement related to the dichotomous sentencing 
recommendation (life or death), controlling for heinousness of the crime and criminal 
history.  Additional regression analyses included (a) all of the statutory mitigating and 
aggravating factors, (b) the presentation and agreement with mental retardation as a 
mitigating factor, and (c) defendant’s race (i.e., white or African American) as a control 
variable.  A further logistic regression equation was also calculated to examine which, if 
any, of these mental illness-related mitigating factors, or combination of factors, were 
most likely to result in a life sentence recommendation.  
Last, the exploratory hypothesis was examined by simultaneously regressing 
sentencing recommendation on the presentation of each mental illness-related mitigating 
factor (yes or no), the time period of the trial (pre-1989, 1989-1994, and post-1994), and 
the interaction between the presentation of each factor and time period of the trial.  Sub-
analyses were conducted to examine the interactions between jury agreement with each 
mental illness-related mitigating factor (agree or disagree) and time period of the trial.  A 
logistic regression equation was calculated for each mental illness-related mitigating 
factor by only including those cases in which that factor was presented to the jury, 
simultaneously regressing sentencing recommendation on whether the jury agreed that 
the factor was mitigating (yes or no), the time period of the trial (pre-1989, 1989-1994, 
and post-1994), and the interaction between jury agreement and time period of the trial.  
The odds ratios of significant predictors are provided as effect size estimates, and the 
correct classification of each model is reported.       
4. Results 
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    Initial analyses revealed that an intended control variable (the aggravating factor 
involving previous conviction of a capital felony or the juvenile equivalent of a capital 
felony) lacked sufficient variability to be included in further analyses.  The seven cases in 
which this aggravating factor was presented to the jury were removed from the data-set.  
Analyses revealed that the removal of these seven cases did not significantly affect 
outcomes.  Preliminary analyses also were conducted to evaluate the statistical 
assumptions of all analyses.  All assumptions were met unless otherwise specified. 
4.1 Descriptives 
As may be seen in Table 1, a total of 182 (57.1%) of the capital defendants 
received a death sentence, and 137 (42.9%) received a life sentence.  At least one mental 
illness-related mitigating factor was presented to the jury in 241 (75.5%) of the capital 
cases, and the number presented ranged from 1 to 9 (M = 1.72, SD = 1.49).  Most often, 
both “mental or emotional disturbance,” and impaired “capacity to appreciate or conform 
conduct” (30.7% of cases) were presented to the jury together.  Severe mental illness was 
presented to the jury in 23 (7.2.0%) cases, and the jury agreed that this evidence was 
mitigating in 15 (65.2%) of those cases.  Eight (53.4%) of those defendants received a 
death sentence.11  See Table 1 for descriptive data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
                                                 
 
11
 Given the small number of cases in which severe mental illness was presented to the jury as a non-
statutory mitigating factor, jury agreement and subsequent sentencing decisions are only presented 
descriptively (see Table 1).  Hypothesis testing on the relationship between severe mental illness as a 
mitigating factor and sentencing decision could not be explored with inferential statistics due to insufficient 
power.  
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Descriptive Data of Mental Illness-Related Mitigating Factors  
 
a
 = Information about jury agreement was unavailable in those cases in which mental 
illness-related mitigating factors were not presented to the jury. 
 
 
4.2 Primary hypothesis 
To test the primary hypothesis, a binary logistic regression was conducted in 
which sentencing decision was regressed simultaneously on the three mental illness-
related mitigating factors and two control variables (heinousness of the crime and 
criminal history).  Sentencing decision was not significantly related to either jury 
agreement (b = .24, SE = .39, p = .53) or disagreement (b = .29, SE = .51, p = .57) with 
mental illness as a non-statutory mitigating factor when it was presented to the jury.   
    Sentencing Decision 
  
Total 
Jury 
Agreed 
Jury  
Disagreed 
 
Death 
 
Life 
 N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Any mental illness-
related factor 
     
     None presented 78 (24.5) --a -- a 39 (50) 39 (50) 
     One + presented 241 (75.5) 176 (73.0) 65 (27.0) 143 (59) 98 (41) 
Mental or emotional 
disturbance 
     
     Not presented 125 (39.2) -- a -- a 60 (48) 65 (52) 
     Presented 194 (60.8) 137 (70.6) 57 (29.4) 122 (63) 72 (37) 
Capacity to 
conform/appreciate 
     
     Not presented 113 (35.4) -- a -- a 65 (57.5) 48 (42.4) 
     Presented 206 (64.6) 95 (46.1) 111 (53.9) 117 (57) 89 (43) 
 
Non-statutory mental 
illness-related 
     
     Not presented 231 (72.4) -- a -- a 125 (54) 106 (46) 
     Presented 88 (27.6) 52 (59.1) 36 (40.9) 57 (64.8) 31 (35.2) 
Severe mental illness      
     Not presented 295 (92.8) -- a -- a 166(62.6) 130(37.4) 
     Presented 23 (7.2) 15 (65.2) 8 (34.8) 16 (69.6) 7 (30.4) 
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Both statutorily defined mental illness-related mitigating factors were 
significantly related to sentencing decision.  Specifically, when “mental or emotional 
disturbance” was presented to the jury and the jury disagreed with it as a mitigating 
factor, there was a significantly higher probability that the defendant would receive a 
death sentence than when the jury agreed with it being mitigating (b = 1.06, SE = .47, p = 
.02, OR = 2.90) or when it was not presented to the jury at all (b = 1.79, SE = .49, p < .01, 
OR = 5.97).  A death sentence was about twice as likely when the jury agreed with 
“mental or emotional disturbance” as a mitigating factor than when this factor was not 
presented to the jury (b = 7.23, SE = .37, p = .05, OR = 2.06).  .   
Conversely, when “capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct” was 
presented to the jury and the jury agreed that it was mitigating, there was a significantly 
lower probability that the defendant would receive a death sentence than when the jury 
disagreed that it was mitigating (b = -1.57, SE = .37, p < .01, OR = .21) or when it was 
not presented to the jury at all (b = -1.44, SE = .42, p = .01, OR = .24).  Overall, the 
primary hypothesis model, including all three mental illness-related mitigating factors 
and two aggravating control factors, accurately classified 73.3% of capital defendants as 
receiving a life or death sentence. 
 A similar pattern of findings was reproduced when (a) all of the statutory 
aggravating and mitigating factors were included, and (b) when the presentation and 
subsequent jury agreement with mental retardation as a mitigating factor was included in 
the primary hypothesis model logistic regression above.  As may be seen in Table 2, 
these models correctly classified 81.2% and 72.7%, respectively, of defendants as 
receiving a life or death sentence.  Further, a similar pattern of findings was reproduced 
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when the defendant’s race (i.e., white or African American) was included as a control 
variable.12   This model correctly classified 73.7% of defendants as receiving a life or 
death sentence. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Regression Values for Models with “All Statutory Factors,” “Mental Retardation” and 
Defendant’s Race Included 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
 
                                                 
 
12
 Prior to analyzing race as a control variable, logistic regression analyses were completed to examine the 
interaction between the presentation of mental illness-related mitigating factors and defendant’s race.  No 
significant interaction was observed between the presentation of “mental or emotional disturbance” and 
defendant’s race, “capacity to appreciate or conform conduct” and defendant’s race, or non-statutory 
mental illness-related mitigating factors and defendant’s race. 
Model with all statutory factors Comparison b SEb p ORa 
Mental or emotional disturbance     
Jury agreement Jury disagree -1.03 .57 .07   .36 Not presented 1.18 .46 .01 3.25 
      
Jury disagreement Jury agree 1.03 .57 .07 2.81 Not presented 2.21 .60 <.01 9.13 
Capacity to conform/appreciate      
Jury agreement Jury disagree -1.55 .45 <.01   .21 Not presented -1.63 .50 <.01   .20 
      
Table 2 (continued)       
 
Comparison b SEb p ORa 
Jury disagreement Jury agree 1.55 .50 <.01 4.71 Not presented -.08 .45 .86  
Non-stat. Mental illness-related      
Jury agreement Jury disagree  .13 .69 .85  Not presented  .12 .48 .81  
      
Jury disagreement Jury agree -.13 .69 .85  Not presented -.01 .60 .98  
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a
 = Compares the increased or decreased likelihood of a defendant receiving a death 
sentence to the probability of receiving a life sentence based on whether the mental 
illness-related mitigating factor was presented to the jury and whether the jury agreed or 
disagreed with it when it was presented. 
 
 
 
 Two logistic regression analyses were completed to explore the relationship 
between sentencing decision and different combinations of mental illness-related 
mitigating factors, controlling for heinousness of the crime and criminal history.  First, 
Model with mental retardation Comparison b SEb p ORa 
Mental or emotional disturbance      
Jury agreement Jury disagree -1.11 .48 .02   .33 Not presented .70 .38 .06 2.02 
      
Jury disagreement Jury agree 1.11 .48 .02 3.04 Not presented 1.81 .49 <.01 6.14 
Capacity to conform/appreciate      
Jury agreement Jury disagree -1.51 .37 <.01   .22 Not presented -1.46 .42 <.01   .23 
      
Jury disagreement Jury agree 1.51 .37 <.01 4.54 Not presented   .06 .38 .88  
Non-stat. Mental illness-related      
Jury agreement Jury disagree   .12 .59 .84  Not presented   .27 .39 .48  
      
Jury disagreement Jury agree -.12 .59 .84  Not presented   .16 .52 .76  
Model with defendant’s race      
Mental or emotional disturbance      
Jury agreement Jury disagree -1.25 .47 <.01   .29 
 Not presented .41 .37 .27  
Jury disagreement Jury agree 1.25 .47 <.01 3.01 
 Not presented 1.67 .48 <.01 5.27 
Capacity to conform/appreciate      
Jury agreement Jury disagree -1.60 .35 <.01   .20 
 Not presented -1.18 .41 <.01   .31 
      
Jury disagreement Jury agree 1.60 .35 <.01 4.50 
 Not presented   .42 .38 .27  
Non-stat. Mental illness-related      
Jury agreement Jury disagree   .34 .59 .59  
 Not presented   .16 .38 .68  
      
Jury disagreement Jury agree -.34 .59 .59  
 Not presented   .16 .37 .33  
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when sentencing decision was simultaneously regressed on different combinations of 
mental illness-related mitigating factors that were presented to the jury, only the 
presentation of “mental or emotional disturbance” (b = 1.30, SE = .60, p = .03, OR = 
3.68) and the presentation of all three factors (i.e., “mental or emotional disturbance,” 
“capacity to appreciate or conform conduct,” and a non-statutory mental illness-related 
mitigating factor) (b = .646, SE = .38, p = .09, OR = 1.89) were significantly associated 
with the defendant receiving a death sentence.   Secondly, the different combinations of 
mental illness-related mitigating factors that the jury agreed were mitigating when they 
were presented were included in the logistic regression (along with criminal history and 
heinousness of the crime as control factors).  This second model correctly classified 
71.5% of defendants as receiving a life or death sentence.   
Agreement with only “mental or emotional disturbance” as a mitigating factor 
remained a significant predictor (b = 1.32, SE = .38, p = .01) and was associated with a 
3.73 increase in the likelihood of the defendant receiving a death sentence as compared to 
when no mental illness-related mitigating factors were presented to the jury.  Jury 
agreement that both “mental or emotional disturbance” and “capacity to appreciate or 
conform conduct” were mitigating factors became a significant predictor (b = .90, SE = 
.41, p = .03) and was associated with a 2.46 increase in the likelihood of the defendant 
receiving a life sentence.  Interestingly, when mental illness-related mitigating factors 
were presented to the jury but the jury did not agree that any of them were mitigating, 
defendants were 3.12 times more likely to receive a death sentence than when no mental 
illness-related mitigating factors were presented (b = 1.14, SE = .38, p = .01).        
4.3 Exploratory Hypothesis: Trial Time Period 
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The relationship between mental illness-related mitigating factors and jury 
sentencing recommendations before and after (a) the publication of the ABA Guidelines 
for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989) and (b) 
the availability of LWOP (1994) was explored by simultaneously regressing sentencing 
recommendation on the interaction between the presentation of each mental illness-
related mitigating factors and the time period of the trial, controlling for heinousness of 
the crime and criminal history.     
There was no significant interaction between the presentation of “mental or 
emotional disturbance” and time period of the trial (b = .35, SE = .35, p = .32).  A sub-
analysis examining the interaction between jury agreement with “mental or emotional 
disturbance” (agree or disagree) when it was presented to the jury and time period of the 
trial also was not significant (b = .63, SE = .63, p = .32).  Similar results were found for 
“capacity to appreciate or conform conduct” and the non-statutory mental illness-related 
mitigating factor. 
Given the lack of interactions on sentencing decision, trial time period was 
included in the primary revised research question and associated regression equation, 
which included each of the three mental illness-related mitigating factors, heinousness of 
the crime and criminal history.  Trial time period alone significantly predicted sentencing 
decision (b = .88, SE = .21, p < .01, OR = 2.40); defendants who were tried before 1989 
or between 1989 and 1994 were more likely to receive a life sentence than those 
defendants who were tried after 1994 (5.57 and 4.16 times more likely, respectively).  
This model correctly classified 75.9% of defendants as receiving a life or death sentence. 
5. Discussion 
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The results of this study suggest that the relationship between mental illness-
related mitigating factors and jury decision making may differ depending on the 
mitigating factor presented to the jury.  Specifically, North Carolina juries appeared to 
distinguish between the simple presence of mental illness and the presence of mental 
illness that affected defendants’ decision-making and behavior.  Compared to cases in 
which these mitigating factors were not presented to the jury, capital defendants were less 
likely to receive a death sentence when “capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform 
conduct” was presented to the jury, whereas defendants were more likely to receive a 
death sentence if the statutorily defined mitigating factor “mental or emotional 
disturbance” was presented.  Further, neither the presentation of nor jury agreement with 
non-statutory mental illness-related mitigating factors were significant predictors of 
sentencing decision.  This pattern was consistent regardless of whether only heinousness 
of the crime and criminal history were accounted for, whether all of the aggravating and 
mitigating statutory factors were accounted for, or whether mental retardation as a 
mitigating factor was accounted for.  Notably, these results were not affected by the 
North Carolina sentencing instructions, which mandate a life sentence if the jury does not 
agree with any aggravating factors presented – there was not a single case in which the 
jury disagreed with all of the aggravating factors presented. 
There are three important implications resulting from this difference.  First, the 
presence of mental illness alone – defined as “mental or emotional disturbance” in North 
Carolina – may be subject to more distortion and misunderstanding by the jury.  In the 
current study, North Carolina capital defendants were more likely to receive a death 
sentence if the statutorily defined mitigating factor “mental or emotional disturbance” 
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was presented, regardless of whether the jury agreed or disagreed that it was in fact 
mitigating.  One explanation for this result is that capital juries may have mistakenly 
viewed this mitigating factor as an aggravating factor instead.  This result is consistent 
with previous research showing jurors’ negative – and often frightful – reactions to 
mentally ill offenders (Garvey, 2000).  Further, laypeople often erroneously view those 
with mental illness as abnormally dangerous (Link & Stueve, 1998).  Feelings of fear and 
beliefs regarding future dangerousness may be heightened during the sentencing phase of 
a death penalty trial, a stage at which dangerousness is a concern for the jury and the 
defendant has already been found guilty of the precipitating crime.  Research on death 
qualified juries lends support to this theory of the use of mental illness as an aggravating 
factor rather than a mitigating factor, with studies revealing that death qualified capital 
juries are prone to rejecting arguments for life and are more likely to recommend death 
sentences (e.g., Butler & Moran, 2007).   
An alternative explanation is that capital juries have difficulty understanding 
capital sentencing instructions, including how they should weigh the presence of 
aggravating and mitigating factors during the sentencing phase of trial (Polzer & Kempf, 
2007).  Previous research has shown that many jurors incorrectly believe that the 
presence of certain aggravating factors requires a death sentence or do not understand 
how mitigating evidence should be taken into consideration during sentencing 
determinations (Bentel & Bowers, 2001).  The North Carolina juries in the current study, 
despite finding the presence of “mental or emotional disturbance” mitigating, may have 
misunderstood the instruction that such evidence should weigh in favor of a life sentence.  
Additionally, jurors may have mistakenly believed that when such evidence is presented 
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but not found to be mitigating, it should be weighed as aggravating and in favor of a 
death sentence.  This interpretation raises concerns about capital sentencing instructions 
and highlights previous researchers’ propositions that improvements in such instructions 
are needed to improve jury comprehension (e.g., Polzer & Kempf, 2007). 
Second, consistent with the primary hypothesis, jury agreement with impaired 
“capacity to appreciate or conform conduct” was a significant predictor of capital 
defendants receiving a life sentence.  This may suggest that juries may afford greater 
sentencing weight to mitigation that provides “structure” for how evidence of mental 
illness may impact criminal behavior.  As discussed earlier, the design of capital 
mitigation is to demonstrate lessened moral culpability. Capital jurors in the current study 
appeared to find defendants less culpable (i.e., more likely to recommend a life sentence) 
when they believed defendants’ mental status at the time of the offense affected their 
decision making.  Conversely, the presence of mental illness or mental and emotional 
disturbance at the time of the offense – without a specified link to the criminal act – did 
not decrease jurors’ views of defendants’ culpability.  One explanation for this result is 
that the former provides the jury with the nexus between mental illness and decreased 
culpability, whereas the latter forces juries to make this connection themselves.   
When “mental or emotional disturbance” is offered as a mitigating factor, defense 
attorneys need only present evidence of the defendant’s mental state or mental illness at 
the time of the offense.  By contrast, the mitigating factor “capacity to appreciate 
wrongfulness or conform conduct” not only requires similar evidence (e.g., symptoms of 
mental illness at the time of the offense), but further demands that the defense attorney 
prove that functional legal capacities are impaired as a result of such symptoms.  Without 
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help from defense attorneys, juries may find it difficult to link mental illness or emotional 
disturbance with capacity to appreciate criminality or to conform conduct to the law.   
However, juries shown the mitigating value of defendants’ impaired functional capacity 
may be more likely to recommend life sentences than those for whom no causal link 
between mental illness and behavior is offered.   
Finally, lawyers may incorrectly assume that any mitigation is good mitigation.  
Instead, lawyers should consider the range of potential impacts of offering, what they 
view as, mitigating evidence, on the ultimate sentence.  In the current study, jurors 
appeared to view the presence of mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the 
offense as aggravating regardless of whether they reported agreement with its mitigating 
value.   In fact, even when juries agreed that the presence of mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the offense was mitigating, defendants were more than three 
and a half times more likely to receive death compared to when the defense attorney did 
not offer any mental illness-related mitigating factors.    
It is possible that jurors viewed the presentation of this factor as a mere defense 
strategy, attempting to excuse the convicted defendant’s behavior.  Capital, death-
qualified jurors may mistrust defense attorneys and/or the idea that a mental disorder 
could be an excusing, or even mitigating, condition (Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowen, & 
Thompson, 1984; White, 1987).  This result raises some concern for capital defense 
attorneys who are not only unlimited in their ability to present mitigating evidence 
(Lockett v. Ohio, 1978), but are constitutionally required to conduct a thorough 
investigation to determine possible mitigating evidence (Wiggins v. Smith, 2003).  If 
evidence of mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense is discovered, 
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capital defense attorneys will need to decide whether they should strategically, and are 
ethically permitted to, withhold such evidence from the jury.  Conversely, if possible, it 
appears more beneficial for a defense attorney to present evidence of mental illness 
within the context of impaired functional capacity, thereby showing the jury why such 
evidence may in fact be mitigating.      
The current results provide mixed support for the primary hypothesis that jury 
agreement with the presented mental illness-related mitigating factors would predict a 
greater probability that the jury would recommend a life sentence as compared to when 
the jury disagreed that the presented factor was mitigating or when the factor was not 
presented to the jury at all.  This hypothesis was based on both extant research (e.g., 
Barnett, Brodsky & Davis, 2004; Barnett, Brodsky & Price, 2007) and the growing body 
of commentary calling for the exclusion of offenders with severe mental illness from 
receiving the death penalty (e.g., Batey, 2009).  Nonetheless, the results of this study are 
consistent with the mixed results found in previous research suggesting that juries may 
find evidence related to a defendant’s mental illness to be either mitigating or 
aggravating.  The finding that capital defendants were more likely to receive a death 
sentence if the statutorily defined mitigating factor “mental or emotional disturbance” 
was presented is supported by previous research suggesting that juries find evidence of 
severe mental illness aggravating (Berhman, 1989; Ryan & Berson, 2006) and may be 
more likely to recommend death when such evidence is presented (White, 1987).   
Conversely, the current results also suggest that jurors find a defendant’s impaired 
capacity at the time of the offense sufficiently mitigating to warrant a life sentence.  Such 
an interpretation is supported by previous research (e.g., Barnett, Brodsky & Davis, 2004; 
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Barnett, Brodsky, & Price, 2007) and current criminal law, including legal standards for 
the insanity defense (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17; Model Penal Code § 4.01(1), 1962) and the 
categorical exclusion of offenders from being executed if they are found incompetent for 
execution (Panetti v. Quarterman, 2007).  It also supports Connecticut’s categorical 
exclusion of defendants from receiving a death sentence (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(h), 
2009)  as well as the ABA’s joint recommendation for the categorical exclusion of 
defendants with severe mental illness at the time of the offense from receiving a death 
sentence13 (ABA, 2006).  However, a previous study of mock jurors (undergraduate 
students) found that approximately one quarter of participants incorrectly identified a 
similarly worded mitigating factor as an aggravating factor (Haney & Lynch, 1994).  The 
current study suggests that actual capital juries as a whole may find this factor 
sufficiently mitigating to warrant a life sentence.  Differences in participants (e.g., actual 
capital juries vs. undergraduate students), units of analysis (juries vs. individuals), state 
statutes (North Carolina vs. California), and/or independent variables (sentence received 
vs. identifying aggravating or mitigating factor) between the two studies may also explain 
the different findings.        
 
5.1 Implications for Policy and Practice 
One purpose of the current study was to provide lawyers, judges, and policy 
makers with information relevant to categorically excluding defendants with severe 
                                                 
 
13
 The joint recommendation is that if, at the time of the offense, defendants “had a severe mental disorder 
or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, consequences or 
wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform 
their conduct to the requirements of the law,” they should not be executed or sentenced to death (ABA, 
2006, p. 668). 
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mental illness from receiving the death penalty.  Although the presentation of severe 
mental illness as a mitigating factor could not be examined due to the small number of 
cases in which this information was presented, implications for legal policy may still be 
found.  Capital jurors appeared to find defendants less culpable (i.e., more likely to 
recommend a life sentence) when the defendants’ mental status at the time of the offense 
affected their decision making.  Conversely, the presence of mental illness or mental and 
emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, without a specified link to the criminal 
act, did not decrease jurors’ views of defendants’ culpability.  Similar to other areas of 
law, in which mental illness alone does not excuse the offenders’ actions, the current 
results do not support a categorical exclusion based on mental illness alone.  Instead, 
these findings, if replicated on a national scale, support a policy that might exclude 
defendants who were not rational or whose capacity to appreciate or conform their 
conduct at the time of the offense was impaired but did not rise to the level required of an 
insanity defense.  Similar to an insanity defense, such an exclusion may be appropriately 
conducted on a case-by-case basis using a functional standard.  Although defendants’ 
mental illness may certainly affect their rationality at the time of the offense, jurors may 
not be ready to exclude based on mental illness alone.  
Additionally, this study highlights the importance of the voir dire process for 
defense attorneys in capital trials.  Capital defendants have the right to a “life-qualified” 
jury (Morgan v. Illinois, 1992).  Capital defense attorneys should, therefore, ask potential 
jurors whether or not they will automatically sentence a defendant to death upon 
conviction or upon being presented with certain mitigating evidence, such as the presence 
of mental illness.  This will aid defendants’ right to a life-qualified jury by finding out 
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which potential jurors would sentence a defendant to death without weighing all of the 
evidence presented.  However, people’s predictions of their behavior regularly differ 
from their actual behavior (Gosling, John, Craik & Robins, 1998), making this approach 
fair but potentially ineffective. 
The current findings also emphasize the importance of educating the jury on 
mental health-related mitigating factors.  A defense attorney should thoughtfully decide 
whether to present evidence of mental illness to , and, if answered in the affirmative, how 
to most effectively demonstrate its connection with the defendant’s decision-making and 
behavior at the time of the offense.  Obtaining a mental health expert can assist the 
lawyer in this regard.  Mental health experts’ capital sentencing evaluations must remain 
unbiased regardless of the relationship between mental health-related mitigating factors 
and jury sentencing determinations.  However, the rate of jury disagreement with 
evidence offered as mitigating factors and the potential for jury misunderstanding of 
mitigation presented and capital sentencing instructions generally suggest that if a mental 
health expert believes there to be mental health-related factors that do in fact mitigate 
culpability, the expert should take the time to educate the jury to this end.     
5.2 Limitations 
 The current study sought to examine the relationship between mental illness-
related mitigating factors and actual jury sentencing recommendations.  Its scope was 
limited to studying the treatment of mental illness in actual capital jury sentencing 
recommendations, which is one of the objective indicia of community values used to 
determine whether imposing this punishment is cruel and unusual.  It did not address 
social implications of categorically excluding offenders with mental illness at the time of 
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the offense from receiving a death sentence, nor did it attend to the constitutionality of 
the death penalty in general.  The interpretation of the findings also is limited to the 
extent that they are generalizable beyond the sample used in the current study. 
North Carolina’s capital trial procedures and sentencing statute appear similar to 
those in the majority of other states that still impose the death penalty.  Nonetheless, there 
may be concerns about generalizability given that only publically available cases from 
North Carolina were studied.  For example, North Carolina juries may be different in 
their decision-making processes than juries in other jurisdictions.  Additionally, this study 
was limited to cases that were tried between 1982 and 1998.  Although the North 
Carolina statute has not changed significantly since 1998, there have been shifts in views 
regarding the death penalty since that time (e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 2005).  Further, the 
current study suggests that time period of the trial also may have been a significant 
predictor of sentence received.  Last, only male defendants were included in the current 
study as a way to limit variability and control for extraneous factors.  Female capital 
defendants are extremely rare and executions of females on death row even less frequent 
(Streib, 2005).  The interpretations of the current findings are unlikely to generalize to the 
few women who are tried for capital crimes.         
The current study’s methodology also limits the interpretation of findings.  Some 
alternative explanations or confounding variables could be accounted for using the 
designated archival dataset.  For example, there was limited information in the dataset on 
the quality of representation afforded the defendant or on the quality of mental health 
experts testifying at trial.  Additionally, the dataset did not include information about 
whether or not the defendant admitted to the offense, information that would have helped 
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differentiate between the two statutory mental illness-related mitigating factors and their 
relationships to jury sentencing determinations.  Nonetheless, interpretation of the current 
findings provides a solid foundation for future research. 
5.3 Future research 
The current study extends the small body of literature examining mental health-
related mitigation in death penalty proceedings and offers insight for future research.  
Commentators, professional organizations, and the international community limit their 
recommendations to categorically excluding offenders with severe mental illness from 
receiving death sentences.  However, given the low rates of severe mental illness as a 
mitigating factor in the current study, it lacked sufficient power to analyze its relationship 
with sentencing decision.  Further research, therefore, is needed to examine the 
relationship between severe mental illness and capital sentencing.  Larger data sets, cases 
from multiple jurisdictions, and data from more recent cases (i.e., post-Atkins or -Roper) 
may be needed to obtain sufficient power.  In addition, research from multiple 
jurisdictions and more recent cases is needed to evaluate generalizability of the current 
findings and to aid in determining policy implications for capital defendants with mental 
illness-related impairments at the time of the offense. 
The relationship between mental illness-related mitigating factors and jury 
sentencing recommendations remains unclear.  The current study suggests that when 
capital juries find mitigating value in a defendants’ impaired functional capacity, they 
may be more likely to recommend a life sentence than when no causal link between 
mental illness and behavior is offered.  Replication of the current study with additional 
death penalty jurisdictions will provide generalizability to the current results.  Future 
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research is also needed to more directly examine capital jury decision-making with 
regards to the presence of mental illness at the time of the offense.  Studies with either 
mock or actual juries should focus on the why jurors have difficulty finding sufficient 
mitigating value (i.e., recommend a life sentence) when presented with the simple 
presence of mental illness.  Last, more research is needed to determine whether a policy 
that might exclude defendants whose functional capacity was impaired by mental illness, 
but did not  to the level required of an insanity defense, and the practicality of conducting 
this exclusion on a case-by-case basis. Given the importance of mitigating evidence to the 
capital defendant and the fact that “death is different,” (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, p. 
412) further research in this area is necessary.   
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Appendix A. North Carolina Statutorily Enumerated Aggravating Factors 
N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-2000 (1982-1998)   
 
 
 
 
Sentence of death or life imprisonment for capital felonies; further proceedings to 
determine sentence. 
(e) Aggravating Circumstances.--Aggravating circumstances which may be considered 
shall be limited to the following: 
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.  
*(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony. [or had 
been previously adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for committing an 
offense that would be a capital felony if committed by an adult.] 
*(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to the person. [or had been previously adjudicated delinquent in 
a juvenile proceeding for committing an offense that would be a Class A, B1, B2, 
C, D, or E felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person if the offense 
had been committed by an adult.] 
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.  
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an 
aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, 
arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or 
discharging of a destructive device or bomb.  
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.  
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any 
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.  
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, employee 
of the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former judge or 
justice, prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or former 
witness against the defendant, while engaged in the performance of his official 
duties or because of the exercise of his official duty.  
*(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person 
by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives 
of more than one person.  
(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of 
conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by 
the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons.  
 
*: Control variables  
[italicized portion]: Added in 1994 & 1995 amendments 
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Appendix B. North Carolina Statutorily Enumerated Mitigating Factors 
N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-2000 (1982-1998) 
 
 
 
 
Sentence of death or life imprisonment for capital felonies; further proceedings to 
determine sentence 
(f) Mitigating Circumstances.--Mitigating circumstances which may be considered shall 
include, but not be limited to, the following: 
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
*(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence 
of mental or emotional disturbance. 
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or 
consented to the homicidal act. 
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed 
by another person and his participation was relatively minor. 
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person. 
*(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired. 
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified 
truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony. 
*(9) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have 
mitigating value. (e.g., mental illness/ MI)  
 
* = Mental Illness-Related Mitigating Factor 
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